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The goal of international trade theories is to explain the exchange of goods and services between
different countries, aiming to benefit from it. Albeit the idea is very simple and known since ancient
history, smart policy and business strategies need to be implemented by each subject, resulting in
a complex as well as not obvious interplay. In order to understand such a complexity, different
theories have been developed since the sixteenth century and today new ideas still continue to enter
the game. Among them, the so called classical theories are country-based and range from Absolute
and Comparative Advantage theories by A. Smith and D. Ricardo to Factor Proportions theory by E.
Heckscher and B. Ohlin. In this work we build a simple hydrodynamic model, able to reproduce the
main conclusions of Comparative Advantage theory in its simplest setup, i.e. a two-country world
with country A and country B exchanging two goods within a genuine exchange-based economy and
a trade flow ruled only by market forces. The model is further generalized by introducing money
in order to discuss its role in shaping trade patterns. Advantages and drawbacks of the model are
also discussed together with perspectives for its improvement.
PACS numbers: 89.65Gh
I. INTRODUCTION
International trade theories help to elucidate the ba-
sis for trade and the gains from trade, but also, how the
gains from trade are generated, and how are they large
and how are they divided among the trading nations.
Theories also explain the pattern of trade. That is, which
commodities are traded and which are exported and im-
ported by each country. Presumably a nation will volun-
tarily engage in trade only if it gains from import-export.
Although the idea is very simple and known since ancient
times, the policies and intelligent strategies adopted by
different countries move on dynamics not always inter-
pretable preventively. Even more so today, indeed, where
the global trade is governed by multiple and changing fac-
tors, often combined in a subtle way and often demanding
an explanation.
To understand this complex scenario, the approaches
are different with different results since the sixteenth
century. The Leitmotiv of these contributions is the
law of comparative advantage [1], which is still one of
the most important and unchallenged laws of economics,
with many practical applications to nations, as well as
to individuals. The Comparative Advantage (CA) is also
studied in terms of the opportunity cost theory, as re-
flected in production possibility frontiers or transforma-
tion curves.
Smith’s theory [2, 3] for the first time considered the
ability of a country to a better efficiency in the produc-
tion of a good with respect to a second country. In a
simple but ideal two-country world, that would result in
an advantage for the first country, which could special-
ize in producing that good. At the same time, if the
second country would be more efficient in producing an-
other good, it could specialize in this effort. In this way a
better efficiency makes production to increase and trade
to flow according only to market forces with a clear bene-
fit for people in both countries. In conclusion, according
to Smith’s theory both countries gain from exchange and
their wealth can be measured in terms of the living stan-
dards of the local population. The main drawback in the
above reasoning was essentially due to the possible occur-
rence of one country in the network without any absolute
advantage in producing a good and the other efficient in
producing both goods. This issue found a satisfying solu-
tion in the CA theory by Ricardo [4], whose main feature
was the international immobility of production’s factors.
Indeed factors were considered as completely immobile
among countries, while goods showed a complete mobil-
ity and a constant unit cost. In this context a compara-
tive advantage takes place if a country can be more effi-
cient in producing a particular good with respect to other
goods. As a consequence, it will specialize in the produc-
tion of that good and this makes international trade to
depend on a difference in the comparative cost of pro-
ducing goods. The net result is that each country should
produce and export the goods in which it has a compar-
ative advantage while importing those goods in which it
has a comparative disadvantage within an environment
characterized by open and free markets. This is clearly a
drawback, which was addressed by Heckscher and Ohlin
[5] theory. According to such a theory, countries differ
with respect to production factors, such as land, labor
and capital, whose cost depends on supply and demand.
In this framework, a country specializes in the produc-
tion and export of goods characterized by a great supply
and cheaper production factors, while establishes to im-
port goods being in short supply. Another drawback of
CA theory is that it provides a static framework; in this
respect one may wonder how trade patters change as a
2function of time. To this and other issues, such as the
possibility to introduce further factors in the understand-
ing of international trade flows, are devoted modern trade
theories [6]. As pointed out by Helpman [7][8] and Krug-
man [9][10][11], modern theories have been developed in
order to take into account mainly the increasing of the
trade to income ratio, the concentration of trade flows
as well as the expansion of intra-industry trade among
industrialized countries. According to Markusen [12][13]
the expansion of intra-industry trade could be ascribed
to the increasing of the demand for differentiated prod-
ucts with respect to that for homogeneous ones, while a
model developed by Spence [14] and Dixit and Stiglitz
[15] focused on the link between trade and consumption.
In this way policy changes may be recognized as the driv-
ing force behind the increase in trade volume. Finally the
meaning and the role of CA idea in monetary economies
has been discussed as well, together with its effect on
the long-run equilibrium pattern of trade [6][16][17]. In
this context a direct impact of exchange rates changes on
trade balance has been found and its effect on exchange
rate policy widely investigated [18][19][20][21].
In summary, Ricardo’s ideas represented a fundamen-
tal starting point for the development of modern theories
of international trade, even if it is clear that the matter
is really complex and characterized by networks of more
than two countries and two goods to exchange and by
the interplay of a lot of different variables. Indeed Com-
parative Advantage may still provide the underlying idea
for the optimal allocation of any country’s resources and
the maximization of world welfare, and the consequence
would be that the benefits of free trade outweigh the costs
[22], even if today it is believed that international trade
couldn’t find a complete explanation within a single the-
ory but it may require resorting to different ones at the
same time.
Among the physical models that can be employed to
describe this kind of situations, there are flow models.
The first such model was introduced by the French physi-
cian Quesnay [23], who was inspired by the analogy with
circulatory flow of the human blood. In this model, there
is an economic equilibrium which is stationary, closed and
without distinction between productive factors and pro-
duced goods. The only source of wealth is agriculture
(as appropriate for those times), and its products are
then freely distributed among the other social classes.
This approach has been generalized in the 19th century
by Fisher, who recognized that the production cycle of
work and goods should be complemented by a second,
monetary circuit. This has been the basis for more re-
cent work (see e.g. [24] and references therein), where
Fisher’s ideas are cast into thermodynamical language.
In particular the production and the money in circle are
the analogs of work and heat exchange respectively.
In this work, in the same spirit of modeling economic
behavior using general physics, we build a simple hy-
drodynamic model, based on a leaking bucket analogy
introduced in previous works [25, 26], able to reproduce
the main conclusions of CA theory in its simplest setup,
i.e. a two-country world with country A and country B
exchanging two goods within a genuine exchange-based
economy and a trade flow ruled only by market forces.
Production and exchange costs are introduced in order to
evaluate the convenience each country has in producing
or sharing a good. Explicit analytic solutions of the dy-
namical equations are given for different exchange paths
(i.e. for different exchange functions). A fixed point
analysis is carried out and a region in the parameters’
space is found, where the time evolution of the amounts
of money for both countries shows a lower bound. This
allows us to understand how money affects trade and, in
general, to investigate the role of CA law within mon-
etary economies. Finally, advantages and drawbacks of
the model are discussed together with perspectives for its
extension.
The paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we introduce the model system under
study within the CA theory framework, i.e. a two-
country world with country A and country B exchanging
in principle different goods. We adopt a communicating
vessels scheme, with each vessel behaving as a leaking
bucket [25]. The exchange of goods between the coun-
tries is modeled with a simple superposition of Heavyside
theta functions in order to get an analytic solution. In
Section 3 some simple examples are discussed in order to
illustrate the usefulness of the model. In Section 4 the
model is augmented with the introduction of production
and exchange cost, in order to be able to evaluate the
convenience for each country in producing or sharing a
good. Finally, in Section 5 conclusions and perspectives
of this work are presented.
II. THE MODEL
The aim of this Section is to reproduce the main results
of classical CA theory in its simplest setup, i.e. a two-
country world with country A and country B exchanging
in principle different goods.
Suppose two countries A and B are both producers of
certain goods, and that they are willing to share their ex-
cess production of the latter. More precisely, they agree
to share these goods only when their internal demand can
be satisfied and a certain reserve is secured. Notice that
this is a simplified model, in that it doesn’t account for
other macroeconomic variables, such as the consumers’
different preferences, the role of brand names and prod-
uct reputations in buyers’ decisions, the temporary ad-
vantage gained as a consequence of the development of
a novel technology, etc. Furthermore in this Section we
limit ourselves to a genuine exchange model, without in-
troducing prices in the analysis. This more complicated
issue will be addressed in Section 4.
This situation can be modeled, for any of the shared
goods, using a communicating vessels scheme [25]. Since
at this level the dynamics related to different goods are
3FIG. 1: Communicating vessel scheme for production, con-
sumption, and exchange of a given good k for countries A
and B.
decoupled, we consider the case of just one good. In this
scheme, the volume of the liquid in each vessel represents
the amount of the good that each country holds. Let us
denote by PA, PB the rates of production of the good
in countries A and B respectively, and let CA, CB be
the rates of consumption. Moreover, let σ be the rate
of exchange. It is assumed that each country starts ex-
changing after the reserve of the good reaches a given
threshold. In the communicating vessel scheme this is
denoted by SAh0 or SBh0, where SA,B are the sections
of the vessels and h0 is a given critical height. Since there
is no immediate significance for the sections of the vessels
in the economic context, in the following we assume for
simplicity that SA = SB = 1.
The dynamics of the system is then given by the fol-
lowing equations
PA − CA − σF (hA, hB) =
·
hA (1)
PB − CB + σF (hA, hB) =
·
hB.
The function F models the exchange between the coun-
tries. We choose
F (hA, hB) =
(
hA
h0
− 1
)
θ
(
hA
h0
− 1
)
−
(
hB
h0
− 1
)
θ
(
hB
h0
− 1
)
(2)
where θ(x) is the unitary step function, whose roˆle is to
ensure that the exchange is turned on only when one of
the nations reaches the critical height. Note that this is
not an empirical type of law. Rather, with this choice we
are assuming that the agreement between the countries
is such that the effective exchange rate σF is linear in
the excess product if the exchange is unidirectional, and
in the difference of excesses if the exchange is bilateral.
We assume consumption rates to be constant. Such
a choice is not in line with a strict hydrodynamic
model since in that case Torricelli’s law would apply, i.e.
CA,B ∼
√
hA,B.
Before going on it is convenient to normalize all the
variables by defining
P˜A,B =
PA,B
h0
, (3)
C˜A,B =
CA,B
h0
, (4)
σ˜ =
σ
h0
, (5)
ηA,B =
hA,B
h0
. (6)
Since in the following there is no risk of confusion, we
shall omit the tildes. In what follows, we shall assume
that also PA,B and σA,B are constants. In the new vari-
ables, the dynamical equations (1) read:
PA − CA − σf(ηA, ηB) =
·
ηA (7)
PB − CB + σf(ηA, ηB) =
·
ηB.
where f(ηA, ηb) = (ηa− 1)θ(ηA− 1)− (ηB − 1)θ(ηB − 1).
We can distinguish the following four cases:
f(ηA, ηB) =


0 if ηA, ηB < 1
ηA − 1 if ηA > 1, ηB < 1
−(ηB − 1) if ηA < 1, ηB > 1
ηA − ηB if ηA > 1, ηB > 1
(8)
In each case the equations admit an analytic solution.
Let us study them separately:
a. ηA, ηB < 1, f(ηA, ηB) = 0. This is the simplest
case since there is no exchange and the two subsystems
are decoupled. The equations read:
PA − CA =
·
ηA (9)
PB − CB =
·
ηB (10)
and the solution is:
ηA(t) = (PA − CA)t+A1 (11)
ηB(t) = (PB − CB)t+B1, (12)
where the integration constants A1 and B1 are to be de-
termined at the time where this condition sets in. This
solution is valid until ηA or ηB reaches the value 1, where
exchange enters the game.
b. ηA > 1, ηB < 1, f(ηA, ηB) = ηA − 1. In this
case country A, being above the threshold, has started
exchanging goods with country B, whose dynamics is
4therefore driven by that of country A. The dynamical
equations read:
PA − CA − σ(ηA − 1) =
·
ηA (13)
PB − CB + σ(ηA − 1) =
·
ηB. (14)
The first equation is independent of B. It can be solved
to yield:
ηA(t) =
PA − CA + σ
σ
+A2e
−σt (15)
By substituting this solution into the second equation
(14) we get
·
ηB = PB − CB + PA − CA + σA2e
−σt (16)
whose solution is:
ηB(t) = (PB − CB + PA − CA)t−A2e
−σt +B2 (17)
As in the previous case, the integration constants must
be determined in the instant of time where this regime
starts.
c. ηA < 1, ηB > 1, f(ηA, ηB) = −(ηB − 1). The
dynamical equations read:
PA − CA + σ(ηB − 1) =
·
ηA (18)
PB − CB − σ(ηB − 1) =
·
ηB . (19)
from which it is clear that the solution can be obtained
from the one found in the previous case by exchanging
A with B. This is to be expected since in this case it
is country B that is above the threshold and shares its
excess goods with country A.
d. ηA > 1, ηB > 1, f(ηA, ηB) = ηA − ηB. In this
case both countries are above threshold, so that exchange
goes in both ways. The dynamical equations read:
PA − CA − σ(ηA − ηB) =
·
ηA (20)
PB − CB + σ(ηA − ηB) =
·
ηB. (21)
We can rewrite this system using vector notation, setting
η =
(
ηA
ηB
)
, P =
(
PA − CA
PB − CB
)
(22)
and
M = σ
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
(23)
so that
·
η +Mη = P. (24)
The matrix M is singular, thus one eigenvalue is zero,
the other eigenvalue being 2σ. The system can be easily
solved, but it is useless to write down the explicit solu-
tions.
III. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
In order to illustrate the usefulness of the model, in
this section we provide a simple example.
Suppose that the two countries agree to maintain the
production rates PA and PB at high enough levels so that
a steady state of equations (7) is reached under conditions
d. Still, the two countries would like not to overproduce
the shared goods.
Suppose that the production capability of country A is
higher than the production capability of country B. The
two countries may then agree to reach a steady state
defined by
ηA = 1 + ǫ, (25)
ηB = 1 (26)
Then Eqs. (7) under steady state conditions tell us that
PA = CA + ǫσ (27)
PB = CB − ǫσ (28)
which means that country A can make an effort to pro-
duce more than what expected to reach a stationary state
with ηA = ηB = 1, while country B can slow down its
production rate. Of course, in order to compensate for
the effort of country A, country B can agree to make an
effort on the production of a different good. This possi-
bility will be explored in the next section.
From the above example it is clear that each country
benefits from trade, also in the presence of a productivity
growth in only one country.
IV. INTRODUCING MONEY
In order to evaluate the convenience the countries have
in producing or sharing a good we need to introduce the
production and exchange costs. This is the topic of the
present Section, which is devoted to a generalization of
the previous model. In this way the role of money in
shaping trade patterns will be pointed out clearly.
More precisely, we denote by xA and xB the production
costs of the given good for both countries. We assume
that xA < xB , in order to take into account the fact that
country A has more capability of producing the good.
Also, let yA and yB be the selling prices of the good on
the internal markets of the two countries.
Despite international trade is also determined by var-
ious endowments of the countries, it remains implicitly
solidary. Indeed, within this cooperating solidary coun-
tries environment, each country tends to export goods
whose production uses more intensively those factors that
are relatively more abundant in the country, typical of the
comparative advantage. As anticipated in the Introduc-
tion, the comparative advantages are determined by the
relative abundance of production factors and production
5technologies (the relative intensity with which produc-
tion factors are used in the different sectors). Each coun-
try will tend to produce intensive goods in the factors of
which it is relatively well-equipped. The country where a
factor is relatively abundant exports goods whose output
is relatively intensive in that factor and, on the contrary,
it imports goods that are relatively intense in the rela-
tively low production factor in the country. This complex
dynamics, according to Heckscher-Ohlin’s model [6], in
international trade leads to a convergence of the relative
prices of traded goods. So, there is a direct relationship
between relative prices of goods and factor prices, trade
also leads to price factor equilibrium. In some respects,
similar conclusion also comes from Samuelson’s theory
of International Trade and Equalization of Factor Prices
[27, 28]. On the contrary, ”price differences across coun-
tries are determined by trade barriers and by a country’s
specialization in production.” [29].
After the two countries start exchanging the good,
these two relative prices converge to a common value y,
to which also the price of the good in international trade
tends. We consider it to be the case that such a conver-
gence has already happened. We assume moreover that
international agreements are such that
xA < y < xB (29)
i.e. country B finds itself in the situation that the pro-
duction cost of the good exceeds the cost of the good on
the international market. Then country B can decide to
stop producing the good and cover its necessities by im-
porting it from country A. In this case we are clearly in
case b, i.e. ηA > 1, ηB < 1. The situation is described by
five variables, PA, PB, ηA, ηB and σ. Moreover there are
the fixed parameters xA, xB, y, CA and CB . Supposing
we are at a fixed point, consistently with our hypothesis
that all transients are gone, the equations for the quan-
tities ηA and ηB are
PA − CA − σ(ηA − 1) = 0, (30)
PB − CB + σ(ηA − 1) = 0. (31)
These two equations reduce the number of parameters of
the problem from 5 to 3. In the following we consider ηA,
ηB and σ as independent variables (with the constraint
ηA > 1, ηB < 1), and PA and PB are determined by the
above fixed point equations.
Let us denote by mA and mB the amounts of money
for countries A and B. The equations which describe
their variations are:
dmA
dt
= −xAPA + y[CA + σ(ηA − 1)] (32)
dmB
dt
= −xBPB + y[CB − σ(ηA − 1)]. (33)
The conditions we seek are dmA
dt
≥ 0 and dmB
dt
≥ 0.
−xAPA + y[CA + σ(ηA − 1)] ≥ 0 (34)
−xBPB + y[CB − σ(ηA − 1)] ≥ 0. (35)
Solving the fixed point equations (30) and (31) with re-
spect to the P ’s and substituting in our conditions we
get
(y − xA)[CA + σ(ηA − 1)] ≥ 0 (36)
(y − xB)[CB − σ(ηA − 1)] ≥ 0. (37)
Since CA+σ(ηA−1) ≥ 0, and by hypothesis −xA+y ≥ 0
also, the first inequality is always satisfied. The second
one requires CB − σ(ηA − 1) ≤ 0, since by hypothesis
−xB + y ≤ 0. On the other hand the left hand side of
this inequality is a non negative quantity being nothing
but PB, therefore our condition can be satisfied only if
CB = σ(ηA − 1) (38)
i.e. if PB = 0. Thus the only way for country B not to
lose money is to completely stop production of the good,
importing from country A all the amount consumed. If
country B wants to have a positive income, i.e. dmB
dt
≥ 0,
the only way is to have a second good for which
xA2 > y2 > xB2 (39)
so that it is country A that imports the second good from
country B, so that a symmetric situation is achieved,
described by the equations
dmA
dt
= −xA1PA1 + y1[CA1 + σ1(ηA1 − 1)]
−xA2PA2 + y2[CA2 − σ2(ηB2 − 1)], (40)
dmB
dt
= −xB1PB1 + y1[CB1 − σ1(ηA1 − 1)]
−xB2PB2 + y2[CB2 + σ2(ηB2 − 1)]. (41)
for the amounts of money, while the fixed point equations
are
PA1 = CA1 + σ1(ηA1 − 1), (42)
PA2 = CA2 − σ2(ηB2 − 1), (43)
PB1 = CB1 − σ1(ηA1 − 1), (44)
PB2 = CB2 + σ2(ηB2 − 1), (45)
where the indices 1 and 2 refer to the two different goods.
Thus the time evolution of the amounts of money for the
two countries at the fixed point are described by
dmA
dt
= (−xA1 + y1)PA1 + (−xA2 + y2)PA2, (46)
dmB
dt
= (−xB1 + y1)PB1 + (−xB2 + y2)PB2. (47)
Putting
α1 = −xA1 + y1 > 0, (48)
α2 = −xA2 + y2 < 0, (49)
β1 = −xB1 + y1 < 0, (50)
β2 = −xB2 + y2 > 0. (51)
6the inequalities dmA
dt
≥ 0, dmB
dt
≥ 0 read
α1
−α2
≥
PA2
PA1
, (52)
β2
−β1
≥
PB1
PB2
(53)
Explicitly, the two inequalities read
CA2 − σ2(ηB2 − 1)
CA1 + σ1(ηA1 − 1)
≤ −
y1 − xA1
y2 − xA2
, (54)
CB1 − σ1(ηA1 − 1)
CB2 + σ2(ηB2 − 1)
≤ −
y2 − xB2
y1 − xB1
. (55)
Actually, in international trade agreements participat-
ing countries are required to match their respective trade
balances. In the case of a two side agreement the trade
balances are equal and opposite, thus the requirement is
that they both be equal to zero. In formulas, we require
BA1 +BA2 = −BB1 − BB2 = 0 (56)
where
BA1 = y1σ1(ηA1 − 1), (57)
BA2 = −y2σ2(ηB2 − 1), (58)
BB1 = −y1σ1(ηA1 − 1), (59)
BB2 = y2σ2(ηB2 − 1). (60)
This requirement translates in the following relation
which links the exchange rates of the two goods:
σ2 =
ηA1 − 1
ηB2 − 1
y1
y2
σ1. (61)
Substituting this relation in the inequalities (54, 55), we
obtain
CA2 − σ1(ηA1 − 1)
y1
y2
CA1 + σ1(ηA1 − 1)
≤ −
y1 − xA1
y2 − xA2
, (62)
CB1 − σ1(ηA1 − 1)
CB2 + σ1(ηA1 − 1)
y1
y2
≤ −
y2 − xB2
y1 − xB1
. (63)
which remarkably depend only on two variables, σ1 and
ηA1. These inequalities must be satisfied together with
the conditions PA2 = CA2 − σ1(ηA1 − 1)
y1
y2
≥ 0, PB1 =
CB1 − σ1(ηA1 − 1) ≥ 0. These two inequalities require
that the consumption rates of the imported goods in the
two countries be not too small and that the exchange rate
σ1 be not too large. The figure shows the region in the
σ1 − ηA1 plane where all inequalities are satisfied. As a
final remark, our model shows clearly that both countries
may benefit from free exchange. Therefore, as a general
rule, one may say that, given this occurrence, any trade
restriction should be avoided.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Σ1
ΗA1
FIG. 2: Locations of the points where all four inequali-
ties are satisfied. The used values of the parameters are
CA1 = 1, CA2 = 5, CB1 = 7, CB2 = 2, xA1 = 1, y1 = 2, xB1 =
3, xA2 = 5, y2 = 4, xB2 = 2. We considered σ1 ≥ 0.5 and
ηA1 ≥ 1.5 in order to avoid numerical singularities, but in
principle we can have σ1 ≥ 0 and ηA1 ≥ 1.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Although most nations claim to be in favor of free
trade, it seems paradoxical that today, most of them con-
tinue to impose many restrictions on international trade.
As a result, they advocated restrictions on imports, in-
centives for exports, and strict government regulation of
all economic activities. Indeed, the list of protected prod-
ucts is long and varied. By so doing, both nations end
up consuming more of both commodities than without
trade.
Despite modern protectionists claim that the compar-
ative cost doctrine has little contemporary validity, and
might apply more in a static world in which capital and
labor would be fixed in quantity and immobile interna-
tionally - and trade restrictions are needed because the
economy is not sufficiently adaptable to changing com-
parative advantages, the international mobility of capital
and managerial resources can quickly alter factor propor-
tions, thereby raising the risks of specialization and the
costs of adjustment - the economic lesson of comparative
advantage demonstrates, and this work too, that both
international trading partners are best served without
trade restrictions. While not denying that comparative
advantages change more rapidly today than in past, the
contemporary economy has sufficient flexibility to adjust
to such changes.
7Comparative advantage shows tariffs and trade quo-
tas protect inefficient firms, harm consumers and lower
total productivity. The fact that the country A gains
much more than the country B is not important. What
is important is that both nations can gain from special-
ization in production and trade. With complete special-
ization, the equilibrium-relative commodity prices will be
between the pretrade-relative commodity prices prevail-
ing in each nation.
According to the law of comparative advantage, even if
one nation is less efficient than (has an absolute disadvan-
tage with respect to) the other nation in the production of
both commodities, there is still a basis for mutually ben-
eficial trade. The less efficient nation should specialize in
the production and export of the commodity in which its
absolute disadvantage is less. This is the commodity of
its comparative advantage. The principle of comparative
advantage remains as cogent today as it was in Ricardo’s
time.
In this work, building on a leaking bucket analogy and
a communicating vessels scheme [25], we introduced a
simple hydrodynamic model, able to reproduce the main
conclusions of CA theory in its simplest setup, i.e. a two-
country world with country A and country B exchang-
ing two goods within a genuine exchange-based economy
and a trade flow ruled only by market forces. We mod-
eled the exchange flux between countries by means of
a simple but non trivial exchange function in order to
get an analytic solution while retaining all the main phe-
nomenology. Finally, production and exchange costs are
included in this framework in order to evaluate the conve-
nience each country has in producing or sharing a good.
A fixed point analysis has been carried out and a region
in the parameters’ space has been found, where the time
evolution of the amounts of money for both countries
shows a lower bound. That allowed us to assess the role
of money in shaping trade patterns.
Our results reproduce the main features of CA the-
ory. In a free exchange world all countries benefit from
trade; that happens also in the presence of productivity
growth only in one country. More in general, countries
gain because they export goods whose prices are rela-
tively higher while import goods whose prices are rela-
tively lower. The focus is on cooperation rather than
on competition and on the free exchange flow between
countries. We would like to emphasize the roˆle played by
the trade balance constraint, which represents the only
action required from the government.
We have to point out that our model doesn’t take into
account the role of other macroeconomic variables, such
as the consumers’ different preferences, the role of brand
names and product reputations in buyers’ decisions, the
temporary advantage gained as a consequence of the de-
velopment of a novel technology, etc.. In fact the leaking
bucket model is based on the concept of representative
agent and, as such, is subjected to all its limitations [30].
Finally, it would be interesting to recast the problem
in the language of cooperative Game Theory [31]. In this
context a general N -player game could be envisaged with
cooperation as the mandatory choice in order to reach a
free trade regime.
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